Advantages and weaknesses of P2P networks
In P2P networks, all clients provide resources, which may include bandwidth, storage space, and computing power. As nodes arrive and demand on the system increases, the total capacity of the system also increases. This is not true of a client-server architecture with a fixed set of servers, in which adding more clients could mean slower data transfer for all users.[citation needed]
The distributed nature of P2P networks also increases robustness,[citation needed] and—in pure P2P systems—by enabling peers to find the data without relying on a centralized index server[citation needed]. In the latter case, there is no single point of failure in the system.[citation needed]
As with most network systems, unsecure and unsigned codes may allow remote access to files on a victim's computer or even compromise the entire network.[citation needed] In the past this has happened for example to the FastTrack network when anti P2P companies managed to introduce faked chunks into downloads and downloaded files (mostly mp3 files) were unusable afterwards or even contained malicious code.[citation needed] Consequently, the P2P networks of today have seen an enormous increase of their security and file verification mechanisms. Modern hashing, chunk verification and different encryption methods have made most networks resistant to almost any type of attack, even when major parts of the respective network have been replaced by faked or nonfunctional hosts.
Usually Internet providers (ISPs) do not welcome P2P users in their networks. The reason is that P2P clients tend to increase the traffic. Compared to Web browsing, e-mail or most other uses of the internet, where data is only transferred in short intervals and relative small quantities, P2P consists usually in a relatively heavy use of the internet connection due to the ongoing file transfers and swarm/network coordination packets.
A possible solution to this is called P2P caching, where a ISP stores the part of files most accessed by P2P clients in other to save access to the Internet
Sunday, July 26, 2009
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Could it be that the cultural diktats in Iran have actually helped enhance the country's creativity quotient? A group of Iranian artists, photographers and filmmakers gathered as part of the Iranian Art Festival at Sharjah's Qanat Al Qasba agreed and disagreed, but agreed to disagree with all the fine graces of Persian etiquette that are world-renowned, but rarely talked about in the mainstream anymore.
"I would be bold to say that it is not so much a result of censorship or restrictions, but over the years, through our civilisations, Iranians have acquired this ability to convey things through double meanings. There can always be another interpretation to anything we say," says Raana Farmoud, an artist and member of the Dena Group.
The group was set up by eight female artists at the start of the millennium, not so much to make a feminist statement in their own country, but to act as a voice outside Iran.
"It's actually the outside world, where we need to have more collective power and voice to be heard and exhibit," says painter Maryam Shirinlou. "Women in every country need to show this sort of unity if they want to be heard, but if you take Iran, I find that people outside have a very small and negative understanding of the women, so I think it's essential to show another face. To show that we can work with authorities and with the government without being related, and that we can work without being dependent on men."
Dismissing the tag of feminism instantly, the women say they admire some facets of the movement but make it clear that they are not proponents of it.
Within Iran, the women say their gender does not make them an instant target for the culture custodians, adding that they enjoy the same privileges — or lack of — as the men. "Artists are looked at as artists, man or woman, doesn't matter," says Yasmin Sinia, a sculptor who uses her works to "criticise women in Iranian ``````````````
"I would be bold to say that it is not so much a result of censorship or restrictions, but over the years, through our civilisations, Iranians have acquired this ability to convey things through double meanings. There can always be another interpretation to anything we say," says Raana Farmoud, an artist and member of the Dena Group.
The group was set up by eight female artists at the start of the millennium, not so much to make a feminist statement in their own country, but to act as a voice outside Iran.
"It's actually the outside world, where we need to have more collective power and voice to be heard and exhibit," says painter Maryam Shirinlou. "Women in every country need to show this sort of unity if they want to be heard, but if you take Iran, I find that people outside have a very small and negative understanding of the women, so I think it's essential to show another face. To show that we can work with authorities and with the government without being related, and that we can work without being dependent on men."
Dismissing the tag of feminism instantly, the women say they admire some facets of the movement but make it clear that they are not proponents of it.
Within Iran, the women say their gender does not make them an instant target for the culture custodians, adding that they enjoy the same privileges — or lack of — as the men. "Artists are looked at as artists, man or woman, doesn't matter," says Yasmin Sinia, a sculptor who uses her works to "criticise women in Iranian ``````````````
history of Iran

History of Iran's and great irans also referred to as the iranica culitural contient'' by the encyclopedia iranica.
One of the last Ghajar kings introduced the idea of elections and a legislative assembly (called the Majlis), but it wasn't until the charismatic Persian Reza Khan came along in 1923 that the idea stuck. On 4 June 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini died, leaving an uncertain legacy. Two months later Hojjat-ol-Eslam Rafsanjani was elected president, a post which had previously been largely ceremonial, and Khomeini's position as Supreme Leader was taken by the former president, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.


history Iran's
Religious and Political Discourse in Iran
Winter/Spring 2003 – Volume IX, Issue 2 243
FOROUGH JAHANBAKHSH
Assistant Professor, Islamic Studies
Queen’s University, Canada
Religious and Political
Discourse in Iran:
Moving Toward
Post-Fundamentalism
Since the landslide victory of Mohammad Khatami and his reformist government
in Iran’s 1997 presidential election, Iran has justifiably garnered
much attention once again. If successful, the new reform movement will
constitute a political experience as significant as the 1979 Revolution. Today’s
is a unique religio-political experience unfolding from within a fundamentalist
theocracy two decades old. Although this reform movement is still evolving, its
points of departure from the ruling theocratic regime are evident. Political change
is driven by a variety of factors—social, economic, cultural, international influences,
etc.—and the recent political reform movement in Iran is no exception.
Social problems associated with the rise of a new generation, economic crisis
and uncertainty regarding nationalization or privatization, political factionalism
and power struggles, Iran’s relative isolation internationally and the pressure of
globalization all set parameters for the emergence of this reform movement and
have been rather extensively discussed. Nevertheless, these studies view the
reform movement as an exclusively political phenomenon and do not explain
how a dogmatic, ideological, religious milieu has produced from within such a
popular democratic language and outlook that cries for nothing less than “pluralism,”
“human rights,” “civil society,” and “rule of law.” Addressing this question,
this paper examines this recent shift in Iranian political discourse from the
vantage point of a shift in religious discourse.
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, five major patterns of political
behavior and political discourse are traceable in the modern history of Iran:
Winter/Spring 2003 – Volume IX, Issue 2 243
FOROUGH JAHANBAKHSH
Assistant Professor, Islamic Studies
Queen’s University, Canada
Religious and Political
Discourse in Iran:
Moving Toward
Post-Fundamentalism
Since the landslide victory of Mohammad Khatami and his reformist government
in Iran’s 1997 presidential election, Iran has justifiably garnered
much attention once again. If successful, the new reform movement will
constitute a political experience as significant as the 1979 Revolution. Today’s
is a unique religio-political experience unfolding from within a fundamentalist
theocracy two decades old. Although this reform movement is still evolving, its
points of departure from the ruling theocratic regime are evident. Political change
is driven by a variety of factors—social, economic, cultural, international influences,
etc.—and the recent political reform movement in Iran is no exception.
Social problems associated with the rise of a new generation, economic crisis
and uncertainty regarding nationalization or privatization, political factionalism
and power struggles, Iran’s relative isolation internationally and the pressure of
globalization all set parameters for the emergence of this reform movement and
have been rather extensively discussed. Nevertheless, these studies view the
reform movement as an exclusively political phenomenon and do not explain
how a dogmatic, ideological, religious milieu has produced from within such a
popular democratic language and outlook that cries for nothing less than “pluralism,”
“human rights,” “civil society,” and “rule of law.” Addressing this question,
this paper examines this recent shift in Iranian political discourse from the
vantage point of a shift in religious discourse.
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, five major patterns of political
behavior and political discourse are traceable in the modern history of Iran:
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